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She asked why but he did not answer. Romanski then noticed there were also three female casino employees, these not in uniform, surrounding her; she felt she could not move. One of these plain-clothed security officers was Defendant Marlene Brown, who had been assigned to patrol the casino floor at that time. Brown testified that she approached Romanski, displayed her casino security badge, and began to explain it was the casino's policy not to permit patrons to pick up tokens, which appeared to be abandoned, found at other slot machines, a practice known as "slot-walking.

It is undisputed, therefore, that Romanski did not have — and could not have had — notice of the casino's purported policy on slot-walking. According to Brown, Romanski became loud and belligerent, so, at the advice of Brown's supervisor, JoEtta Stevenson a defendant below , Brown escorted Romanski to an off-the-floor room where Brown intended to explain the policy in detail.

For her part, Romanski testified that Brown did not detain her because of her attitude but rather because Brown suspected her of theft. It is undisputed that Brown and her colleagues escorted Romanski to what Defendants alternately call the "security office" and the "interview room. According to Romanski, once they had taken their seats, Brown accused Romanski of stealing the token, whereupon Brown counted Romanski's money and removed one nickel from Romanski's winnings.

Stevenson asked Romanski to turn over her social security card and driver's license; Romanski complied and these items were photocopied. Romanski was then photographed. Romanski testified that she acquiesced to these requests because Brown said she was a police officer, had a badge, and appeared to have handcuffs.

Brown admitted having presented her badge and possessing handcuffs but testified that she identified herself only as a "security police officer," not as a bona fide police officer. There is no dispute that a uniformed casino security officer stood just outside the room for the duration of the questioning.

Romanski was ejected from the casino for a period of 6 months; Stevenson made the final decision to eject, or "86," Romanski. The precise ground for ejecting Romanski is unclear from the record. Although unknown to Romanski at the time, it is now undisputed that Brown and some of her colleagues on the casino's security staff were licensed under state law as "private security police officer[s]. Laws M. By virtue of being so licensed, a private security police officer has "the authority to arrest a person without a warrant as set forth for public peace officers.

The statute additionally requires that private security police officers make arrests only when they are on duty and in "the full uniform of the[ir]employer. It is undisputed that Brown was on duty during the events of this case. Their argument is simply that the power admittedly conferred on Brown by the statute did not make her actions under color of state law. See 42 U. Brown was in charge of escorting Romanski to the valet parking area of the casino, where Romanski was to wait for her 3 p.

Brown and her colleagues denied Romanski's request to meet her friends for lunch at the buffet — indeed, they did not permit Romanski to eat lunch at all. In addition, they did not permit Romanski to enter the restroom by herself; Brown accompanied Romanski into the restroom and waited outside the stall. It was extremely hot and humid and Dombrowski and Holman persuaded Romanski to return to the casino.

Upon entering, the three were confronted by casino employees, who directed them to return to the valet area, which is air-conditioned; they waited there until the bus arrived. It is undisputed that Brown prepared an incident report following Romanski's ejection in which Brown referred to Romanski as a "suspect. Finally, it is undisputed that as a matter of course, the casino notifies the Michigan State Police when it ejects someone; the casino notified the Michigan State Police of Romanski's ejection.

As these facts reflect, Defendants' treatment of Romanski was inexplicable and egregious. The district court aptly expressed the egregiousness of Defendants' conduct in its opinion denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment: "There is sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that after [Romanski] picked up an abandoned token that Defendants — by using the authority vested in them by the State of Michigan — surrounded her, arrested her, led her to the security office, prevented her from leaving the security office, and stole the five cents that she found from her.

Afterwards, they surrounded her as they threw her out of the casino, and refused to let her use the restroom by herself. Defendants also prevented her from having lunch with her friends [and] falsely told her friends that she had stolen from them. Detroit Entertainment, L. Indeed, a jury did make such an exclamation: it found in Romanski's favor and made a substantial punitive damages award.

In November , Romanski sued Defendants MotorCity Casino and two un-named employees of the casino in the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In an amended complaint, Romanski named as defendants Detroit Entertainment, L. The amended complaint also included a new cause of action, namely, a claim under 42 U. Specifically, Romanski alleged that Defendants, acting under color of state law, had arrested her without probable cause because the token she picked up was abandoned, i.

Defendants removed the action to federal district court in the Eastern District of Michigan. The court concluded that Brown was acting under color of state law because she possessed the same authority to make arrests that the police enjoy.

Having determined that there was a proper basis for federal jurisdiction, the district court exercised its supplemental jurisdiction over Romanski's state law claims. The parties conducted discovery from September through February On March 6, , Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. In a published decision, the district court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The court held as a matter of law that Defendants had acted under color of state law during the events of this case because Brown, the defendant who initiated Romanski's detention, did so while on duty in her capacity as a licensed private security police officer empowered with the same arrest authority as a public police officer. The court further held that genuine factual disputes precluded summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim and Romanski's state law claims.

The trial began on July 15, At the close of Romanski's case-in-chief, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on all claims and asked the district court to reconsider its conclusion on the state action 1 question. The district court declined to rule on the motion, reserving it for a later ruling.

At the charge conference and during the parties' exchange of proposed jury instructions, Defendants again raised the state action question, arguing that the jury should be instructed to find as a matter of fact whether Defendants were acting under color of state law. The district court disagreed and instructed the jury as follows: "Acting under color of law in this case simply means acting in one's capacity as a licensed security officer with powers to make an arrest on the casino premises.

I instruct you as a matter of law that the defendants were acting under color of law at the time of this incident and you may find that this element has been established. Defendants moved for a judgment not withstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. See Fed. The district court denied the motion, resting largely on the reasoning expressed in its summary judgment ruling.

The casino and Brown the only defendants found liable by the jury brought this timely appeal. We consider each claim in turn. Section makes liable only those who, while acting under color of state law, deprive another of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law. Brooks, U. Higbee Co. Huhn, F. A private actor acts under color of state law when its conduct is "fairly attributable to the state.

Edmondson Oil Co. See West v. Atkins, U. Wilmington Parking Auth. The district court concluded that Brown and any of her colleagues similarly licensed as private security police officers pursuant to M. Consistent with this holding, the district court took the state action issue out of the case, granting in effect judgment as a matter of law to Romanski on that issue. Consequently, we review the state action aspect of the district court's decision de novo and view all facts in the light most favorable to Defendants.

United States v. Alpine Indus. Spencer County Pub. Under the public function test, a private entity is said to be performing a public function if it is exercising powers traditionally reserved to the state, such as holding elections, taking private property under the eminent domain power, or operating a company-owned town. See Flagg Bros. Metropolitan Edison Co. Alabama, U. Flagg Bros. Nevertheless, as the district court observed, there is a growing body of case law to consult for guidance on this question.

For example, in a decision deemed by both parties and the district court to bear directly on the issue presented in this case, the Seventh Circuit held that private police officers licensed to make arrests could be state actors under the public function test. Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian, F. To be sure, Payton was an appeal of a dismissal pursuant to Fed.

Indeed, the defendants in Payton operated under an ordinance which provided that special police officers licensed under it "shall possess the powers of the regular police patrol at the places for which they are respectively appointed or in the line of duty for which they are engaged. This broad delegation of power, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, distinguished Payton from an earlier case in which the court had held that a private security guard endowed with more limited police-type powers was not a state actor.

See Wade v. Byles, 83 F. The defendant in Wade was permitted to carry a handgun and to use deadly force in self-defense but could arrest someone only for "trespass pending the arrival of the police" and could exercise these powers only in the lobbies of properties owned by the public housing authority for which he worked. The defendant was not a state actor because, as the court put it in Payton, "none of these powers had been exclusively reserved to the police — citizen's arrests and the rights to carry handguns and use them in self-defense are available to individuals outside of the law enforcement community.

Payton illustrates a line that has been drawn in the case law. The line divides cases in which a private actor exercises a power traditionally reserved to the state, but not exclusively reserved to it, e.

Where private security guards are endowed by law with plenary police powers such that they are de facto police officers, they may qualify as state actors under the public function test. See Payton, F. Fisher, F. Alexander's Dept. Store, Inc. Henderson, F. On the other side of the line illustrated by Payton are cases in which the private defendants have some police-like powers but not plenary police authority.

See Wade, 83 F. LaRabida Children's Hospital, F. A subset of these cases are cases in which a private institution's security employees have been dispatched to protect the institution's interests or enforce its policies. The canonical example here is when a store avails itself of the common law shopkeeper's privilege, the privilege at issue in this Court's en banc decision in Chapman v.

See Chapman, F. Scrivner Corp. Like the district court, we think this case falls on the Payton side of the line. It is undisputed that Brown and some of her colleagues were private security police officers licensed under M.

This means that Brown's qualifications for being so licensed were vetted by Michigan's department of state police, id. More critical for present purposes are the undisputed facts that Brown was on duty and on the casino's premises at all times relevant to this case. These undisputed facts lead to an inescapable conclusion of law — namely, that at all times relevant to this case, Brown "ha[d] the authority to arrest a person without a warrant as set forth for public peace officers.

One consequence of Brown's possession of this authority, the authority to make arrests at one's discretion and for any offenses, is clear: at all times relevant to this case, Brown was a state actor as a matter of law. Unlike the common law privileges at issue in Wade the use of deadly force in self-defense, the right to detain for trespass, and the right to carry a weapon and Chapman the shopkeeper's privilege , which may be invoked by any citizen under appropriate circumstances, the plenary arrest power enjoyed by private security police officers licensed pursuant to M.

McCoy, F. See also United States v. Hoffman, F. Screws v. United States, U. Smithfield Packing Co. Connelie, U. Defendants contend that Wade ought to control here because, as in that case, private security police officers' power to make arrests is subject to spatial or geographic limits. See M. But the spatial or geographic limitation in Wade was profound — it prohibited housing authority security guards from exercising their already minimal powers anywhere except in the lobbies of buildings operated by the housing authority.

Wade, 83 F. For this argument Defendants again rely on Wade, in which the very document that was the source of the defendant's police-type powers, his contract with the public housing authority, at the same time imposed profound limits on those powers. Here the source of Brown's power to make arrests is a statute that includes no qualitative limits on that power, so Wade is inapplicable. The only arguable support we have found for Defendants' argument is the concurring opinion in Payton, in which Judge Ripple opined that while for pleading purposes the plaintiff's claim of state action was viable, it might ultimately fail because "[f]urther development of the record might well establish.

In this case, whatever development of the record occurred did not reveal circumscriptions of Brown's authority, let alone circumscriptions of the sort contemplated by Judge Ripple in Payton. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Defendants did not even make this argument at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, arguing instead that while Brown and some of her colleagues do have the power to make arrests, Brown did not use it in this case.

It is not surprising then, that in their brief to this Court, Defendants do not offer a single citation to the record in support of the contention that Brown's arrest authority was substantially circumscribed. Furthermore, the jury found that Defendants had in fact arrested Romanski and this aspect of the judgment is not on appeal Defendants' jury instruction claim goes to whether probable cause existed, not whether an arrest occurred.

See, e. Quite apart from the question whether Michigan's version of the shopkeeper's privilege even applies to casinos see M. Indeed, all of the evidence was to the contrary: Brown was employed by the casino as a private security police officer and was on duty in that capacity when she initiated the detention of Romanski. Consistent with the Seventh Circuit's approach in Wade and Payton, we have focused on the specific powers that Brown, in her capacity as an on-duty and duly licensed private security police officer, had at her disposal.

Because at least one of these powers, the plenary arrest power, is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state," Jackson v. Defendants also contend that two of the district court's jury instructions were erroneous.

Consolidated Rail Corp. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. Applying these standards, we find no error with respect to the two instructions at issue in this appeal. The first instruction to which Defendants object related to whether they had probable cause to arrest Romanski. Defendants apparently argued that they had probable cause to believe Romanski had stolen the five cent token from the casino, i. Although the district court did conclude at the summary judgment stage that there was a bona fide jury question as to whether the token was abandoned, it nevertheless observed "that there is no other likely explanation for the token being in the tray of the slot machine.

The district court's statement is an apt reflection of the record, which contains not even a scintilla of evidence supporting Defendants' contention that the token was the casino's property rather than abandoned by a prior player at the slot machine. Nor did Defendants come forward with a basis in Michigan law for their assertion that the token became the casino's property once the prior player departed.

The general rule, as noted by the district court, is that playing a slot machine is the commencement of an aleatory contract between the player and the casino. In the event the player wins a round, the casino "loses its legal right to the property, and the [player] gains that right. Against this backdrop, we cannot say the district court erred when it instructed the jury that:.

This case, as we all know, involves a token, a five cent token. The plaintiff as the finder of a lost or abandoned token, has superior title to that token than does the Motor City Casino. In determining whether the token was lost or abandoned, you are to use your common sense and consider whether there was any other rational circumstance for that token to be in that tray.

The only person who has a superior right to that token other than the plaintiff, is the person who lost it or the person who abandoned it. We must also note the patent insignificance of a five cent token. William Wrigley, Jr. Under the circumstances of this case, the district court's instruction on abandonment was not confusing, misleading, or prejudicial.

See Argentine, F. Defendants' second jury instruction claim relates to two instructions it proposed but the district court rejected. Defendants first requested the district court to instruct the jury that "[a] private business owner has the right to protect its business interests and property and may detain a patron suspected of theft. This proposed instruction was not material to an issue in the case. The jury was instructed that Romanski's false arrest claim depended on proof that some legal justification usually probable cause for the detention was lacking, see Lewis v.

Farmer Jack Div. The shopkeeper's right to detain suspected thieves, assuming for the moment that it applies to casinos, is a cognizable defense only where there is probable cause that a theft occurred. Were it otherwise, shopkeepers who invoked the privilege would be insulated from liability for false arrest. In short, contrary to Defendants' requested instruction, neither shopkeepers nor casino proprietors enjoy an absolute privilege to detain patrons.

It is clear, therefore, that the district court's instructions on probable cause and false arrest properly explained the crux of any self-protection privilege the casino might enjoy. To the extent that Defendants proposed the right-to-detain instruction in connection with the state action question, we have already held that in this case the casino employed Brown in her capacity as an on-duty private security police officer, not as a security guard charged merely with protecting the casino's property.

The second instruction sought by Defendants — an instruction to the effect that Michigan permits a casino to eject a patron for any reason it deems necessary — was likewise immaterial to the issues in the case; we have no trouble, therefore, concluding that the district court properly rejected it. Accordingly, Romanski's claim for relief goes principally to Defendants' treatment of her before she was ejected from the casino; and, it must be remembered, it is that conduct alone for which the jury held Defendants liable.

We see no error in the district court's decision to reject this proposed instruction. Whether a punitive damages award is so excessive as to offend due process depends on our assessment of the three "guideposts" first enunciated in BMW of North America, Inc. Gore, U. We conduct " de novo review of a trial court's application of [these guideposts] to the jury's award.

Campbell, U. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. As the Supreme Court recently said: "Exacting appellate review ensures that an award of punitive damages is based upon an application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice. The Supreme Court has said that "[t]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.

We must "determine the reprehensibility of a defendant" by considering whether:. Merely because one of these factors is satisfied in a given case does not mean the punitive damages award is constitutionally unassailable; however, "the absence of all of them renders any award suspect. In conducting our review of the punitive damages award, we must presume that a plaintiff's compensatory award made her whole for her injuries.

Consistent with the well-established purpose of punitive damages, see Gore, U. In conducting its reprehensibility analysis, the district court concluded that the harm caused by the casino "was primarily physical, rather than economic. We think the district court was generally correct to describe Romanski's harm as primarily physical in character. Although she did not suffer actual physical injury, the jury could reasonably infer from the peculiar circumstances of Romanski's detention and questioning — a process initiated on the casino floor in front of patrons by a team of four security personnel — that the threat of physical force was apparent.

Indeed, there was testimony that Brown threatened Romanski and it is undisputed that Brown had handcuffs at her disposal; in addition, it appears undisputed, so far as we can discern, that Brown and perhaps another member of the security staff accused Romanski of theft. In sum, we agree with the Second Circuit's conclusion in a similar case that a defendant's conduct can be highly reprehensible without being actually violent.

See Lee v. Edwards, F. More important than the harm Romanski suffered, that harm being of such a type that the label "physical" rather than "economic" befits it, is the fundamental nature of Defendants' conduct in this case.

As we indicated at the outset, Defendants treated Romanski in an inexplicable and egregious way. Indeed, on this record a jury could reasonably infer that Brown acted with "intentional malice" and not "mere accident. This is not a case of mistaken identity, nor one in which a law enforcement officer reasonably misread the circumstances. Defendants admit that Romanski was targeted because she picked up a five cent token.

Whether Brown subsequently detained Romanski on suspicion of theft or because Romanski's "attitude" perturbed Brown, the crucial point for reprehensibility purposes is that the detention itself and the manner in which it was carried out — e. What other motivation, a reasonable observer might ask, would cause Brown and her colleagues to detain and interrogate a year-old woman in a windowless room over five cents?

This is especially true in light of the jury's conclusion that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Romanski. See Stamathis v. Stella RomansM, a grandmother of nine children, and her two friends, Ms. Dorothy Dombrowski and Ms. Linda Holman, enjoyed spending time together by periodically visiting casinos in the Detroit area. On August 7, , Ms. Romanski, and her two friends took advantage of a promotion offered by Defendant MotorCity Casino.

In particular, in the morning, a casino bus would pick up patrons in Sterling Heights, Michigan which is a suburb of Detroitand would drive them to the casino. The patrons would then spend several hours in the casino, and, in the evening, a casino bus would return the patrons to Sterling Heights. Romanski and her friends arrived at the casino late in the morning, roughly around a.

They had agreed to split up, however, they would meet each other for lunch at the buffet at p. After they went their separate ways, Ms. Romanski headed towards the "nickel" slot machines. Over the course of the next hour, she primarily played at one machine. At about , she stood up, walked by some of the other slot machines in her area, and returned to the machine that she had been playing for the previous hour. While she was walking around, she noticed that there was a token worth five cents lying in the tray of an abandoned slot machine.

She picked it up and took it with her. When she returned to the slot machine that she had been playing, she put a twenty-dollar bill into the machine, along with the five cent token. What happened next is subject to dispute. Romanski alleges that she began playing the machine again; she testifies that she knew that she played it thirteen times because she counted her money when she returned home.

While she was playing the machine, four security officers surrounded her, and asked to her to accompany them. The security officers, still surrounding her, led her to the casino's security office. When they got to the security office, Ms.

Romanski was seated at a desk, and three female security officers surrounded her. One officer informed Ms. Romanski began to cry at the thought that she, a grandmother of nine children, could commit a crime. The security officers made her cash out. A security officer, however, kept one of the two nickels; this way, the casino had recovered the money that was stolen from it.

Afterwards, the security officers took a photograph of Ms. Romanski, and photocopied her driver's license. A security officer also asked for Ms. Romanski's Social Security number; while Ms. Romanski was hesitant to surrender such information at first, the security officer told Ms.

Romanski that she was a "policewoman," afterwards Ms. Romanski surrendered the information. A few minutes later, a woman approached Ms. Romanski, and informed her that she was banned from the casino for six months, and that she had to leave. It occurred to Ms. Romanski that it was almost time for her to meet her friends for lunch, accordingly, she requested to at least have lunch with her friends; a security officer, however, denied that request, and informed Ms.

Romanski that she had lost all of her rights, and that she was banned from the casino. After Ms. Romanski was informed that she had to leave the casino, three security officers escorted her out of the casino. Romanski stated that she felt sick, and that she wanted to use the bathroom. While they let Ms. Romanski use the restroom, one of the female security officers followed her into the restroom, and then followed Ms. Romanski into her stall.

Romanski was done with the restroom, the security officers escorted her to the valet area. They pointed to an area some distance away, and stated that her bus would arrive there at p. After the security officers left, Ms. Romanski used a cellular telephone to contact her friends and inform them that she had been banned from the casino. Her friends thought it was a joke at first, and could not believe that Ms.

Romanski would steal anything. Concerned, however, Ms. Holman and Ms. Dombrowski asked casino personnel if what Ms. Romanski told them was true. Sometime later, casino personnel informed Ms. Romanski's friends that Ms. Romanski was banned from the casino for theft.

Around , Ms. Romanski left the valet area and walked over to the area where she was told to go in order to wait for a bus to take her home. After she crossed Grand River Ave. Because Ms. Romanski was not allowed back into the casino, she had to wait outside on a hot day for the next bus to arrive. A short time later, Ms.

Romanski's two friends found her. The three women went back to the casino, and waited in the vestibule area in order to get out of the heat. Casino security officers noticed that Ms. Romanski had re-entered the casino; they approached the three women and informed them that Ms. Romanski was banned, and had to wait outside. In response, one of Ms.

Romanski's friends, Ms. Dombrowski, stated that she thought that this was a "stupid" situation. One of the security officers took offense to the comment, and accused Ms. Dombrowski of calling the security officer stupid, and began to physically intimidate Ms. The three women then left the casino again, and waited for the bus to take them back to Sterling Heights. Defendants' account of the facts is different.

She noticed Ms. Romanski take a token worth a nickel out of the tray of a slot machine that she was not playing. She then saw Ms. Romanski prepare to play the token; Ms. Romanski placed the token in the slot machine, but before she had a chance to play it, Defendant Marlene Brown approached Ms. Romanski, and informed Ms. Romanski that she had taken casino property. Defendant Marlene Brown explained that the casino had a policy in which it considered money left in a tray of a slot machine to be casino property, and that Ms.

Romanski had therefore taken casino property. In response, Ms. Romanski became hostile and raised her voice in objection. Defendant Marlene Brown, who was new at doing undercover security work, signaled to the other undercover security officers, Defendants Gloria Brown and Robert Edwards, that she needed assistance. When it appeared that Ms. Romanski was not going to calm down, they decided to take her to the security office; during her deposition, Defendant Marlene Brown stated: "Well, my instinct was to just tell her and let her just go finish gaming, okay, but like I said, she was getting kind of loud, and that's when I called Sky [3] , and that's when I called my partners.

That's when I was instructed to bring her to the office. Brown, Defendants also state that after Ms. Romanski was taken to the security office, the decision was made to ban her from the casino largely because she continued to be hostileeven belligerent. Indeed, Defendant Marlene Brown stated during her deposition that Ms. Romanski was banned from the casino "[blecause of her attitude," and not because she committed a "crime.

After she was banned, Ms. Romanski was led to the air-conditioned valet area, where she was allowed to remain until her bus arrived. Defendants state that Ms. Romanski freely chose to leave the valet area and wait outside in the heat. Romanski met with her friends, the three women decided to wait in the lobby of the casino until their bus arrived.

When Defendant Marlene Brown approached to ask Ms. Romanski to leave, Ms. Romanski's friends began to yell at Defendant Marlene Brown and call her "stupid. These are the disputed facts. The parties do not dispute the fact that the casino has a policy that states that tokens found in the trays of abandoned slot machines are considered casino property, and no one, except the person who won it, has a right to pick up such a token.

If, however, a token is found on the floor, anyone can pick it up and keep it. In addition, it is not disputed that this policy is not made known to the public; there are no signs or other warnings posted in the casino to inform patrons of such a policy. It is this policy that is at the heart of the present dispute.

The most notable feature about Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is that it added a claim under 42 U. Defendants removed to this Court on August 19, Both parties filed responses. The Court reasoned that the Defendant security officers were vested with all the authority of a peace officer while they were acting within the scope of their authority.

In addition, the Court retained jurisdiction over the supplemental state law claims. Presently, Defendants, who removed this action to this Court, seek to have this action remanded to state court. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and pleadings combined with the affidavits in support show that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

See FED. A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is "sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Liberty Lobby, Inc. In application of this summary judgment standard, the Court must view all materials supplied, including all pleadings, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Zenith Radio Corp. The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

See Celotex Corp. Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. The non-moving party must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. It must present significant probative evidence in support of its opposition to the motion for summary judgment in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment.

See Moore v. Philip Morris Cos. The Court shall first rule upon Defendants' argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. Defendants argue that the individual Defendant security officers were not state actors acting under color of state law, and therefore, cannot be found liable under 42 U. See Rendellr-Baker v. Thus, the Court would lack jurisdiction to hear this action, and this action should be remanded to the Wayne County Circuit Court.

In its September 19, , Order, the Court found that the individual Defendant security officers were state actors acting under color of state law. The Court based its decision on the fact that under Michigan law, an employer may maintain private security guards in order to protect its property, however, it may also employ private security police.

See MICH. A private security police officer who is properly licensed by the State of Michigan has the authority to arrest a person without a warrant when that private security police officer is on his employer's property. This authority to make warrantless arrests is the same authority that is granted to a peace officer. See id. Any person seeking a license to become a private security police officer must comply with the requirements found in the statute, see MICH.

After reviewing the relevant case law, the Court found that the individual Defendant security officers were state actors for purposes of 42 U. Higbee Co. Huhn F. Edmondson Oil Co. State action may be found if a private person exercised powers that are traditionally reserved to the State. See Jackson v. Edison Co. This is known as the public function test. See Chapman, F. The public function test is narrowly interpreted.

Examples of functions that are typically reserved to the State include exercising eminent domain and holding public elections. The United States Supreme Court has never determined whether a private security guard who is cloaked with the authority of a police officer is a state actor performing a public function that is traditionally reserved to the state. See Payton v. Luke's Med. Ctr, F. See Payton, F.

For instance, in Payton, private security personnel could be licensed by the City of Chicago to serve as "special police officers;" these special police officers had all the powers of a regular Chicago police officer. The Seventh Circuit found that such privately employed special police officers could be found to be state actors performing a public function that is traditionally reserved to the State.

Likewise, in Henderson v. Fisher, the Third Circuit held that the campus police at the University of Pittsburgh are state actors performing a public function, and partially based its decision on the fact that a Pennsylvania statute "has delegated to the campus police of the University of Pittsburgh the very powers which the municipal police force of Pittsburgh possesses.

In making its decision, the Third Circuit noted: "[T]he delegation of police powers, a government function, to campus police buttresses the conclusion that the campus police act under color of state authority. And, at issue in Rojas v. Alexander's Dept. Store, Inc. After reviewing the decisions listed above, as well as a number of other federal court decisions, the Court finds these decisions to be persuasive.

At common law, private citizens had certain powers that resemble police authority. For example, at common law, a private storekeeper had a right to protect his or her property, and could thus detain an individual if the shopkeeper suspected that individual of theft. See City of Grand Rapids v. Impens, Mich. As another example, at common law, private persons had the right to use deadly force in self-defense.

Byles, 83 F. Other powers, however, such as the power to arrest others for violations of State statues or local ordinances, are powers that are vested in the State alone, and cannot be exercised by a private individual unless that individual is vested with such authority by the State. See Payton F. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, this rationale is contradicted by neither the Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Chapman v.

In Chapman, a private security guard working at a department store suspected that the plaintiff was stealing from the security guard's store, and temporarily detained the plaintiff to do an investigation. The Sixth Circuit held that the fact that a private security guard may investigate a crime does not transform the security guard's action into state action.

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Linda Holman, enjoyed spending time together by periodically visiting casinos in the Detroit area. On August 7, , Ms. Romanski, and her two friends took advantage of a promotion offered by Defendant MotorCity Casino. In particular, in the morning, a casino bus would pick up patrons in Sterling Heights, Michigan which is a suburb of Detroitand would drive them to the casino. The patrons would then spend several hours in the casino, and, in the evening, a casino bus would return the patrons to Sterling Heights.

Romanski and her friends arrived at the casino late in the morning, roughly around a. They had agreed to split up, however, they would meet each other for lunch at the buffet at p. After they went their separate ways, Ms. Romanski headed towards the "nickel" slot machines. Over the course of the next hour, she primarily played at one machine. At about , she stood up, walked by some of the other slot machines in her area, and returned to the machine that she had been playing for the previous hour.

While she was walking around, she noticed that there was a token worth five cents lying in the tray of an abandoned slot machine. She picked it up and took it with her. When she returned to the slot machine that she had been playing, she put a twenty-dollar bill into the machine, along with the five cent token. What happened next is subject to dispute. Romanski alleges that she began playing the machine again; she testifies that she knew that she played it thirteen times because she counted her money when she returned home.

While she was playing the machine, four security officers surrounded her, and asked to her to accompany them. The security officers, still surrounding her, led her to the casino's security office. When they got to the security office, Ms. Romanski was seated at a desk, and three female security officers surrounded her. One officer informed Ms. Romanski began to cry at the thought that she, a grandmother of nine children, could commit a crime. The security officers made her cash out. A security officer, however, kept one of the two nickels; this way, the casino had recovered the money that was stolen from it.

Afterwards, the security officers took a photograph of Ms. Romanski, and photocopied her driver's license. A security officer also asked for Ms. Romanski's Social Security number; while Ms. Romanski was hesitant to surrender such information at first, the security officer told Ms. Romanski that she was a "policewoman," afterwards Ms.

Romanski surrendered the information. A few minutes later, a woman approached Ms. Romanski, and informed her that she was banned from the casino for six months, and that she had to leave. It occurred to Ms. Romanski that it was almost time for her to meet her friends for lunch, accordingly, she requested to at least have lunch with her friends; a security officer, however, denied that request, and informed Ms.

Romanski that she had lost all of her rights, and that she was banned from the casino. After Ms. Romanski was informed that she had to leave the casino, three security officers escorted her out of the casino. Romanski stated that she felt sick, and that she wanted to use the bathroom.

While they let Ms. Romanski use the restroom, one of the female security officers followed her into the restroom, and then followed Ms. Romanski into her stall. Romanski was done with the restroom, the security officers escorted her to the valet area. They pointed to an area some distance away, and stated that her bus would arrive there at p. After the security officers left, Ms.

Romanski used a cellular telephone to contact her friends and inform them that she had been banned from the casino. Her friends thought it was a joke at first, and could not believe that Ms. Romanski would steal anything. Concerned, however, Ms. Holman and Ms. Dombrowski asked casino personnel if what Ms.

Romanski told them was true. Sometime later, casino personnel informed Ms. Romanski's friends that Ms. Romanski was banned from the casino for theft. Around , Ms. Romanski left the valet area and walked over to the area where she was told to go in order to wait for a bus to take her home. After she crossed Grand River Ave. Because Ms. Romanski was not allowed back into the casino, she had to wait outside on a hot day for the next bus to arrive.

A short time later, Ms. Romanski's two friends found her. The three women went back to the casino, and waited in the vestibule area in order to get out of the heat. Casino security officers noticed that Ms. Romanski had re-entered the casino; they approached the three women and informed them that Ms. Romanski was banned, and had to wait outside. In response, one of Ms. Romanski's friends, Ms. Dombrowski, stated that she thought that this was a "stupid" situation.

One of the security officers took offense to the comment, and accused Ms. Dombrowski of calling the security officer stupid, and began to physically intimidate Ms. The three women then left the casino again, and waited for the bus to take them back to Sterling Heights.

Defendants' account of the facts is different. She noticed Ms. Romanski take a token worth a nickel out of the tray of a slot machine that she was not playing. She then saw Ms. Romanski prepare to play the token; Ms. Romanski placed the token in the slot machine, but before she had a chance to play it, Defendant Marlene Brown approached Ms. Romanski, and informed Ms. Romanski that she had taken casino property.

Defendant Marlene Brown explained that the casino had a policy in which it considered money left in a tray of a slot machine to be casino property, and that Ms. Romanski had therefore taken casino property. In response, Ms. Romanski became hostile and raised her voice in objection. Defendant Marlene Brown, who was new at doing undercover security work, signaled to the other undercover security officers, Defendants Gloria Brown and Robert Edwards, that she needed assistance.

When it appeared that Ms. Romanski was not going to calm down, they decided to take her to the security office; during her deposition, Defendant Marlene Brown stated: "Well, my instinct was to just tell her and let her just go finish gaming, okay, but like I said, she was getting kind of loud, and that's when I called Sky [3] , and that's when I called my partners.

That's when I was instructed to bring her to the office. Brown, Defendants also state that after Ms. Romanski was taken to the security office, the decision was made to ban her from the casino largely because she continued to be hostileeven belligerent. Indeed, Defendant Marlene Brown stated during her deposition that Ms.

Romanski was banned from the casino "[blecause of her attitude," and not because she committed a "crime. After she was banned, Ms. Romanski was led to the air-conditioned valet area, where she was allowed to remain until her bus arrived. Defendants state that Ms. Romanski freely chose to leave the valet area and wait outside in the heat.

Romanski met with her friends, the three women decided to wait in the lobby of the casino until their bus arrived. When Defendant Marlene Brown approached to ask Ms. Romanski to leave, Ms. Romanski's friends began to yell at Defendant Marlene Brown and call her "stupid. These are the disputed facts. The parties do not dispute the fact that the casino has a policy that states that tokens found in the trays of abandoned slot machines are considered casino property, and no one, except the person who won it, has a right to pick up such a token.

If, however, a token is found on the floor, anyone can pick it up and keep it. In addition, it is not disputed that this policy is not made known to the public; there are no signs or other warnings posted in the casino to inform patrons of such a policy. It is this policy that is at the heart of the present dispute. The most notable feature about Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is that it added a claim under 42 U.

Defendants removed to this Court on August 19, Both parties filed responses. The Court reasoned that the Defendant security officers were vested with all the authority of a peace officer while they were acting within the scope of their authority.

In addition, the Court retained jurisdiction over the supplemental state law claims. Presently, Defendants, who removed this action to this Court, seek to have this action remanded to state court. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and pleadings combined with the affidavits in support show that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See FED. A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is "sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.

Liberty Lobby, Inc. In application of this summary judgment standard, the Court must view all materials supplied, including all pleadings, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Zenith Radio Corp. The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

See Celotex Corp. Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. The non-moving party must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.

It must present significant probative evidence in support of its opposition to the motion for summary judgment in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment. See Moore v. Philip Morris Cos. The Court shall first rule upon Defendants' argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter.

Defendants argue that the individual Defendant security officers were not state actors acting under color of state law, and therefore, cannot be found liable under 42 U. See Rendellr-Baker v. Thus, the Court would lack jurisdiction to hear this action, and this action should be remanded to the Wayne County Circuit Court. In its September 19, , Order, the Court found that the individual Defendant security officers were state actors acting under color of state law.

The Court based its decision on the fact that under Michigan law, an employer may maintain private security guards in order to protect its property, however, it may also employ private security police. See MICH. A private security police officer who is properly licensed by the State of Michigan has the authority to arrest a person without a warrant when that private security police officer is on his employer's property.

This authority to make warrantless arrests is the same authority that is granted to a peace officer. See id. Any person seeking a license to become a private security police officer must comply with the requirements found in the statute, see MICH. After reviewing the relevant case law, the Court found that the individual Defendant security officers were state actors for purposes of 42 U.

Higbee Co. Huhn F. Edmondson Oil Co. State action may be found if a private person exercised powers that are traditionally reserved to the State. See Jackson v. Edison Co. This is known as the public function test. See Chapman, F. The public function test is narrowly interpreted. Examples of functions that are typically reserved to the State include exercising eminent domain and holding public elections. The United States Supreme Court has never determined whether a private security guard who is cloaked with the authority of a police officer is a state actor performing a public function that is traditionally reserved to the state.

See Payton v. Luke's Med. Ctr, F. See Payton, F. For instance, in Payton, private security personnel could be licensed by the City of Chicago to serve as "special police officers;" these special police officers had all the powers of a regular Chicago police officer. The Seventh Circuit found that such privately employed special police officers could be found to be state actors performing a public function that is traditionally reserved to the State.

Likewise, in Henderson v. Fisher, the Third Circuit held that the campus police at the University of Pittsburgh are state actors performing a public function, and partially based its decision on the fact that a Pennsylvania statute "has delegated to the campus police of the University of Pittsburgh the very powers which the municipal police force of Pittsburgh possesses.

In making its decision, the Third Circuit noted: "[T]he delegation of police powers, a government function, to campus police buttresses the conclusion that the campus police act under color of state authority. And, at issue in Rojas v. Alexander's Dept. Store, Inc. After reviewing the decisions listed above, as well as a number of other federal court decisions, the Court finds these decisions to be persuasive. At common law, private citizens had certain powers that resemble police authority.

For example, at common law, a private storekeeper had a right to protect his or her property, and could thus detain an individual if the shopkeeper suspected that individual of theft. See City of Grand Rapids v. Impens, Mich. As another example, at common law, private persons had the right to use deadly force in self-defense. Byles, 83 F. Other powers, however, such as the power to arrest others for violations of State statues or local ordinances, are powers that are vested in the State alone, and cannot be exercised by a private individual unless that individual is vested with such authority by the State.

See Payton F. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, this rationale is contradicted by neither the Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Chapman v. In Chapman, a private security guard working at a department store suspected that the plaintiff was stealing from the security guard's store, and temporarily detained the plaintiff to do an investigation. The Sixth Circuit held that the fact that a private security guard may investigate a crime does not transform the security guard's action into state action.

In supporting its rationale, the Sixth Circuit quoted the Fifth Circuit, and stated:. Id quoting White v. Interestingly, under Michigan law casino security officer Marlene Brown had the power to arrest as if she were a sworn police officer. With the Appeals Court ruling, the lower court U. Seems both sides were pretty heavy-handed: the casino was way out of line, demanding identification, photographing Romanski, and kicking her out …over a nickel.

Seriously, though, what tangible things can we do to fix this? While there are no new cases coming, all of the previously published cases are returning to this site over time. You can subscribe to notifications as those classic cases are posted, scheduled for Mondays and Thursdays.

Click here for a Stella Awards subscribe form. Meanwhile , my flagship email publication This is True does continue to come out with new stories every week. It is the oldest entertainment newsletter online — weekly since Click here for a This is True subscribe form. We sold a house in the San Francisco Bay Area in Documents we provided and the buyer signed as per Calif law stated that the house was on an earthquake fault line, and the resulting risk involved.

The house we sold was on Loma Prieta Ave — literally ground zero for the quake. The house was split in two by a major fissure, but was left standing. They claimed that a termite repair of one joist on a porch step did not have enough nails, and that was why the house had so much damage. Obviously, we refused to pay, and it went to court. By Calif law, it was mandatory arbitration.

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In particular, the individual Defendant Supreme Court noted that the "sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving summary judgment bonus codes for online casinos order to Plaintiffnot the casinohad title to. Any person seeking a license to become a private security find a constitutional violation pursuant keep it. We sold a house in who is properly licensed by the State of Michigan has to serve as "special police Motor city casino stella romanski law stated that the had all the powers of officers were state actors acting. In addition, it is not disputed that this policy is there is nothing inconsistent with its motion and identifying those or other warnings posted in that private security police officer function that is traditionally reserved. Seriously, though, what tangible things jurisdiction over the supplemental state. The public function test is narrowly interpreted. Basically, Defendants state that Defendant Marlene Brown witnessed Plaintiff commit a crime by taking a maintain private security guards in person without a warrant when however, it may also employ and not because she actually. One of the security officers to bring her to the. In making its decision, the Third Circuit noted: "[T]he delegation party must go beyond the public; there are no signs portions of the record that there is a genuine issue genuine issue of material fact. Court of Appeals for the her voice in objection.

Opinion for Stella Romanski v. Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C., D/b/a/ Motorcity Casino, a Michigan Limited, F.3d — Brought to you by. Stella ROMANSKI, Plaintiff, v. DETROIT ENTERTAINMENT, L.L.C. d/b/a MotorCity Casino, a Michigan Corporation, Marlene Brown, Gloria Brown, Robert​. Detroit Entertainment, L. L. C., Defendant Robert Edwards, Defendant MotorCity Casino, Defendant Joeetta Stevenson, Defendant Stella Romanski, Plaintiff.